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Abstract
In 1932, Go¨del proved that there is no finite semantics for intuitionistic logic.
We consider all fragments of intuitionistic logic and check in each case whether a
finite semantics exists. We may fulfill a didactic goal, as little logic and algebra are
presupposed.
1 Introduction
As is well known, classical logic has a finite semantics. In the beginning of the twenties
of the twentieth century, mathematicians like Kolmogorov, Glivenko, and Heyting began
to study intuitionistic logic, at that time sometimes called “the logic of M. Brouwer” (see
[12], [4], and [10], respectively). The natural question arises whether also intuitionistic
logic has a finite semantics. In 1932, Go¨del proved that there is no finite semantics for
intuitionistic logic. In his words, he wrote that intuitionistic logic has no Realisierung
mit endlich vielen Elementen (see [6]). In fact, Go¨del’s argument also holds for posi-
tive logic, that is, the conjunction-disjunction-conditional fragment of intuitionistic logic.
That is, there is no finite semantics for the mentioned fragment. Shortly afterwards, in
1933, Go¨del himself proved that the conjunction-negation fragments of intuitionistic and
classical logic coincide (see [7]). This implies that the conjunction-negation fragment of
intuitionistic logic does have a finite semantics. However, Go¨del result does not hold
when also considering premisses (just note that the Double Negation Law holds in clas-
sical logic, but not in intuitionistic logic). In particular, in this note we will want to
know whether the conjunction-negation fragment has a finite semantics also when having
premisses. In general, it is also natural to ask the same question regarding every fragment
of intuitionistic logic, including the fragment with no connectives, which will be notated
∅. This we do in the present note. All fragments appear pictorially in Figure 1.
The set F of formulas is obtained in the usual way from the set of (propositional)
letters Π, applying the connectives ∧,∨,→, and ¬. Any subset of the connectives will be
called a fragment (of intuitionistic logic). Let F be a fragment. Then, FF denotes the
formulas where only the connectives in F are applied. Note that in intuitionistic logic
the given connectives are independent.
As regards syntactic matters, it is possible to use the corresponding axioms of the
Frege-style axiomatization of intuitionistic logic in the case of fragments with the condi-
tional. For one version of the mentioned axiomatization see [2, Section 11.1]. In the case
of fragments without the conditional, it is possible to use Gentzen’s Natural Deduction.
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However, as we do not have ⊥, we need to use something like the following two rules in
the case of negation, for introduction and elimination, respectively,
[A]
B
[A]
¬B
¬A
and
A ¬A .
B
Gentzen’s Natural Deduction rules for the other connectives may be found in [3, p. 186].
Alternatively, for fragments without the conditional, one may also proceed using the
following rules, where Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F:
(R∈) If ϕ ∈ Γ, then Γ ⊢i ϕ,
(Rm) If Γ ⊢i ϕ then Γ, ψ ⊢i ϕ (monotonicity),
(Rt) If Γ ⊢i ϕ and ∆, ϕ ⊢i ψ, then Γ,∆ ⊢i ψ (cut rule),
(R∧) Γ ⊢i ϕ ∧ ψ iff Γ ⊢i ϕ and Γ ⊢i ϕ,
(R∨) Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢i χ iff Γ, ϕ ⊢i χ and Γ, ψ ⊢i χ,
(R→) Γ ⊢i ϕ→ ψ iff Γ, ϕ ⊢i ψ,
(R¬I) If Γ, ϕ ⊢i ψ and Γ, ϕ ⊢i ¬ψ, then Γ ⊢i ¬ϕ,
(R¬E) If Γ ⊢i ϕ and Γ ⊢i ¬ϕ, then Γ ⊢i ψ.
When we write ⊢F , for F a fragment, we mean that only the rules of the connectives in
F are applied.
∅
{∧} {∨} {→} {¬}
{∧,∨} {∧,→} {∨,→} {∧,¬} {∨,¬} {→,¬}
{∧,∨,→} {∧,∨,¬} {∧,→,¬} {∨,→,¬}
{∧,∨,→,¬ }
Figure 1: The sixteen fragments of intuitionistic logic
Now , let us define semantic consequence for a given algebra.
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Definition 1. Let F be a fragment, let Γ∪{ϕ} ⊆ FF , let AF be an algebra with universe
V and an operation for every connective in F , and let D ⊆ V . Then, we say that ϕ is a
semantic consequence of Γ in AF with D (and use the notation Γ AF ,D ϕ) iff for every
assingment v : Π → V , the unique homomorphism v¯ : FF → V , satisfies that if v¯ψ ∈ D,
for all ψ ∈ Γ, then v¯ϕ ∈ D.
We will use the same symbols for both the connectives and the corresponding algebraic
operations. This ambiguity should not cause any problem.
Under “having a finite semantics” we will understand the same as Go¨del, that is, we
will use the following definition.
Definition 2. The fragment F has a finite semantics iff there exists an algebra AF with
finite universe V and D ⊆ V such that for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ∈ FF it holds that Γ ⊢F ϕ iff
Γ AF ,D ϕ.
It should be clear that, for each fragment, we will be looking for one algebra (not for a
class of algebras) and, moreover, for a finite one.
In Section 2, we will use Go¨del’s argument in order to prove that any fragment hav-
ing the conditional, in particular positive and intuitionistic logics, do not have a finite
semantics. There will only be eight fragments left to consider.
In Section 3, we will see that the conjunction-disjunction fragments and the fragments
contained in it, do have a finite semantics.
In Section 4, we will consider the case of the disjunction-negation fragment.
Funally, in Section 5, we consider the negation and conjunction-negation fragments.
When referring to the conditional fragment, we will say {→}-fragment. Analogously,
in the case of other fragments.
We think this note may fulfill a didactic goal, as little knowledge of logic and algebra
are presupposed.
2 Fragments with the conditional
Lemma 1. Let F be a fragment with →. Then, (i) ϕ ⊢F ϕ, (ii) ⊢F ϕ → ϕ, and (iii)
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ ⊢F ψ (modus ponens).
Proof. (i) follows just using (R∈) and (ii) follows from (i) using (R→). In order to prove
(iii), use (i) to obtain ϕ→ ψ ⊢F ϕ→ ψ and then apply (R→) with Γ = {ϕ→ ψ}.
In what follows we will use Go¨del’s argument with formulas of a different form. In
order to do that, we will use the following abbreviation:
ϕ∨˙ψ = (ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ.
For example, the formula [(p3 → p2)∨˙(p3 → p1)]∨˙(p2 → p1) denotes the formula
([([(p3 → p2)→ (p3 → p1)]→ (p3 → p1))→ (p2 → p1)]→ (p2 → p1)).
Note that ∨˙ is neither commutative nor associative. We will omit parentheses sup-
posing associativity to the left. So, instead of the given formula, we may as well write
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(p3 → p2)→ (p3 → p1)→ (p3 → p1)→ (p2 → p1)→ (p2 → p1).
We will use the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let F be a fragment with → and ϕ ∈ FF such that ⊢F ϕ. Then (i) ⊢F ϕ∨˙ψ,
(ii) ⊢F ψ∨˙ϕ, for any formula ψ ∈ FF , and (iii) If ψ = · · · ∨˙ ϕ ∨˙ · · · , where the given
dots may be empty at the beginning or the end, then ⊢F ψ.
Proof. (i) By (mp) we have ϕ, ϕ → ψ ⊢F ψ. Then, using (R→), it follows that ϕ ⊢F
(ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ. As we have ⊢F ϕ, using the cut rule it follows that ⊢F (ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ. (ii)
As we have ⊢F ϕ, by (Rm) it follows that ψ → ϕ ⊢F ϕ. Then, by (R→) it follows that
⊢F (ψ → ϕ)→ ϕ. Part (iii) follows using (i) and (ii).
We will also use the following algebraic facts, using the ∨˙ notation in a way analogous
to the logical case.
Lemma 3. Let A be a Heyting algebra with universe A. Let a, b ∈ A. Then, (i) If A is
a chain and a < b, then b→ a = a and (ii) if a ≤ b, then a∨˙b = b.
Proof. (i) It is clear that (1) b∧a ≤ a. Now, let us suppose that b∧ c ≤ a, for any c ∈ A.
Then, as A is a chain, then either b ∧ c = b or b ∧ c = c. Now, as a < b, it cannot be the
case that b ∧ c = b. So, b ∧ c = c. Then c ≤ a. So, we have that, (2) for any c ∈ A, if
b ∧ c ≤ a, then c ≤ a. From (1) and (2) it follows that b→ a = a.
(ii) Let us suppose that a ≤ b. So, a → b is top. So, (a → b) → b ≤ b. It is also the
case that b ≤ (a→ b)→ b.
Next come two propositions.
Proposition 1. Let F be a fragment with → such that F has a finite semantics, say with
n ≥ 1 values. Then, the formulas of the following form are derivable in F :
αn = ∨˙
1≤i<j≤n+1
pj → pi.
Proof. Let us suppose that F is a fragment with → that has a semantics with n values,
that is, there exists an algebra with universe |V | = n and D ⊆ V such that for every
Γ ∪ {ϕ} ∈ FF it holds that
(C) Γ ⊢F ϕ iff Γ AF ,D ϕ.
Let us take a valuation w : FF → V and let us consider w(αn). As there are n + 1
propositional letters in αn, but only n values, there must be letters pi, pj such that
w(pi) = w(pj). Now, let us consider the formula βn = αn[pi/pj]. It should be clear that
w(βn) = w(αn). Now, βn = · · · ∨˙(pj → pj)∨˙ · · · , where the given dots may be empty at
the beginning or the end. Now, using Lemma 1 (ii), it holds that ⊢F pj → pj and then,
using Lemma 2 (iii), ⊢F βn. Then, by (C), AF ,D βn. So, AF ,D αn. So, using (C) in the
other direction, ⊢F αn.
Proposition 2. Let αn be a formula as in Proposition 1. Then, 0i αn, for any natural
number n ≥ 1.
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Proof. Let us consider the n + 1-element chain of the first n + 1 natural numbers with
the usual order. Defining meet, join, relative meet complement and meet complement as
usual, the given chain is a Heyting algebra. Let us consider any assignment w such that
w(pi) = i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n + 1. Then,
w¯(αn) = ∨˙
1≤i<j≤n+1
w¯pj → w¯pi,
= ∨˙
1≤i<j≤n+1
w¯pi, (as w¯pi < wpj, using Lemma 3(i)),
= w¯p1∨˙w¯p1∨˙ · · · ∨˙wp2∨˙wp2 · · · ∨˙wpn,
= w¯p1∨˙w¯p2∨˙ · · · ∨˙wpn, (by Lemma 3(ii)),
= w¯pn, (by Lemma 3(ii)),
= n,
6= n+ 1.
Using soundness, it follows that 0i αn.
Theorem 1. Fragments containing → do not have a finite semantics.
Proof. Applying Proposition 1, the formulas αn would be derivable in the fragment, which
cannot be the case, as by Proposition 2, 0i αn.
3 Subfragments of {∧,∨}
Due to the results of the previous section, the remaining fragments to be considered are
the ones appearing in Figure 2.
∅
{∧} {∨} {¬}
{∧,∨} {∧,¬} {∨,¬}
{∧,∨,¬}
Figure 2: The fragments without the conditional
In this section, 2 stands for any algebra of the form 〈{0, 1};F 〉, where F ⊆ {∧,∨}
and ∧ and ∨ stand for the usual meet and join in a lattice or semilattice. In all cases,
D = {1}. It will be clear in the context which is the relevant F , which may be the empty
set.
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Proposition 3. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F{∧}. Then, Γ ⊢{∧} ϕ iff Γ 2 ϕ.
Proof. If Γ ⊢{∧} ϕ, then Γ ⊢i ϕ. Using soundness of intuitionistic logic, it follows that
Γ 2 ϕ. On the other hand, suppose Γ 0{∧} ϕ, that is, Γ 0{∧} p1 ∧ p2 ∧ · · · ∧ pn. Then, by
(R∧), there is a letter pi such that Γ 0{∧} pi. So, again by (R∧), pi is not a subformula of
any formula in Γ. Then, there exists the valuation w such that wpi = 0 and wp = 1 for
letters p other that pi. So, Γ 22 ϕ.
Corollary 1. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F∅. Then, Γ ⊢∅ ϕ iff Γ |=2 ϕ.
Proposition 4. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F{∧,∨}. Then, Γ ⊢{∧,∨} ϕ iff Γ 2 ϕ.
Proof. If Γ ⊢{∧,∨} ϕ, then Γ ⊢i ϕ. Using soundness of intuitionistic logic, it follows that
Γ 2 ϕ. On the other hand, suppose Γ 0{∧,∨} ϕ. Then using the conjunctive normal
form theorem, it follows that ϕ and every formula in Γ may be seen as a conjunction of
disjunction of letters. Then, by (R∧), Γ 0{∧,∨} χ, where χ = q1 ∨ · · · ∨ qn. Also, as every
formula in Γ is a conjunction (of disjunctions), and to have formulas α and β as different
premisses is equivalent to having α∧β as only premiss, then we might as well consider Γ
to be a set of disjunctions and call it ∆. Now, by (R∨), it follows that every disjunction
in ∆ has a letter that does not belong to the set {q1, . . . qn}. Consequently, there exists
the valuation w such that wqi = 0, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and wp = 1 for letters p other than
the qi. So, every formula in ∆ will have value 1. So, Γ 22 ϕ.
Corollary 2. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F{∨}. Then, Γ ⊢{∨} ϕ iff Γ 2 ϕ.
Proof. The proof for the fragment {∧,∨} was reduced to having only disjunctions.
4 The disjunction-negation fragment
Due to the results of the previous sections, the remaining fragments to be considered are
the ones appearing in Figure 3.
{¬}
{∧,¬}
{∧,∨,¬}
{∨,¬}
Figure 3: The four remaining fragments
We will use the following lemmas.
Lemma 4. Let F be a fragment with ∨. Then, ϕ ⊢F ϕ ∨ ψ and ψ ⊢F ϕ ∨ ψ.
Proof. Using (R∈), we get ϕ ∨ ψ ⊢F ϕ ∨ ψ. Then, using (R∨) with Γ = ∅, we get both
ϕ ⊢F ϕ ∨ ψ and ψ ⊢F ϕ ∨ ψ.
6
Lemma 5. Let F be a fragment with ∨ and ¬. Then, (i) if ϕ ⊢F ψ, then ¬ψ ⊢F ¬ϕ and
(ii) ⊢F ¬¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ).
Proof. (i) Suppose ϕ ⊢F ψ. Then, by monotonicity, we have ϕ,¬ψ ⊢F ψ. By (R∈) we
also have ϕ,¬ψ ⊢F ¬ψ. Then, using (R¬I), it follows that ¬ψ ⊢F ¬ϕ. (ii) Using Lemma
4, we have ϕ ⊢F ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. Then, by part (i), ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ⊢F ¬ϕ. Using Lemma 4 again,
we have ¬ϕ ⊢F ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. So, using the cut rule, ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ⊢F ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ. Now, by (R∈), we
also have ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ⊢F ¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ). Finally, using (R¬I), we get ⊢F ¬¬(ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ).
Remark 1. Recall that Tertium non datur does not hold in intuitionistic logic. However,
as seen in part (ii) of the last Lemma, its double negation holds in any fragment with ∨
and ¬.
On the other hand, intuitionistic logic enjoys the Disjunction Property, which does not
hold for classical logic.
Lemma 6. Let ϕ, ψ ∈ F. If ⊢i ϕ ∨ ψ, then ⊢i ϕ or ⊢i ψ.
Proof. An algebraic proof runs as follows. If neither ⊢i ϕ nor ⊢i ψ hold, then there are
Heyting algebrasH1, H2 and valuations v1, v2 such that v1ϕ 6= 1H1 and v2ψ 6= 1H2 . Now,
take the direct product H1×H2 and add an element which is greater than any element of
the universe of the given product. Then, the resulting algebra with the natural valuation
will prove that it is not the case that ⊢i ϕ ∨ ψ. For details, the reader may see [13]. For
other proofs, see [14, Exercise 2.6.7 or sections 5.6 to 5.10].
Proposition 5. Let F be such that {∨,¬} ⊆ F . Let us suppose that F has a finite
semantics, say with n ≥ 1 values. Then, the formulas of the following form are derivable
in F :
αn =
∨
1≤i<j≤n+1
¬¬(¬pi ∨ pj).
Proof. Let us suppose that F is a fragment with ∨ and ¬ that has a semantics with n
values, that is, there exists an algebra with universe V such that |V | = n and D ⊆ V
such that for every Γ ∪ {ϕ} ∈ FF it holds that
(C) Γ ⊢F ϕ iff Γ AF ,D ϕ.
Let us take a valuation w : FF → V and let us consider w(αn). As there are n + 1
propositional letters in αn, but only n values, there must be letters pi, pj such that
w(pi) = w(pj). Now, let us consider the formula βn = αn[pi/pj]. It should be clear that
w(βn) = w(αn). Now, it holds that ⊢F ¬¬(¬pj ∨ pj). Consequently, ⊢F βn. Then, by
(C), AF ,D βn. So, AF ,D αn. So, using (C) in the other direction, ⊢F αn.
Proposition 6. The formulas of the form given in Proposition 5 are not intuitionistically
derivable.
Proof. For every i, j, i 6= j, ¬¬(¬pi ∨ pj) is not even classically derivable. So, by Lemma
6, it follows that 0i αn.
Theorem 2. Fragments containing ∨ and ¬ do not have a finite semantics.
Proof. Applying Proposition 5, the formulas of the given form would be derivable in the
fragment, which cannot be the case, as they are not intuitionistically derivable, as stated
in Proposition 6.
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5 The negation and conjunction-negation fragments
We only need to consider fragments {¬} and {∧,¬}. In the Introduction we stated that
Go¨del proved that the set of derivable formulas of the conjunction-negation fragment of
intuitionistic logic coincides with the set of classically derivable formulas. This is also
stated and proved in detail in [11] (see Corollary to (a2) in p. 493). This implies that the
conjunction-negation fragment has a finite semantics with respect to derivable formulas,
that is, two-valued classical semantics. The natural question arises whether we also have
a finite semantics when having premisses as well. This we solve in this section.
As regards syntactics, in this section we will use the following version of the celebrated
Glivenko Theorem and also the given Corollary. Glivenko Theorem was originally proved
for intuitionistic logic in [5]. Before stating those facts, we say that a set of formulas
Γ ∈ F∧,¬ is classically (respectively {∧,¬}-) consistent iff from Γ we may not arrive to a
contradiction in classical logic (respectively in the {∧,¬}-fragment of intuitionistic logic),
where by a contradiction we mean a pair ϕ,¬ϕ of formulas.
Theorem 3. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F∧,¬. Then, if Γ ⊢c ¬ϕ, then Γ ⊢{∧,¬} ¬ϕ.
Corollary 3. Let Γ ⊆ F∧,¬. If Γ is {∧,¬}-consistent, then Γ is classically consistent.
Regarding semantics, we will use the concepts of subalgabra and congruence, which
we now state (for details or examples the reader may see [1]).
Definition 3. Given two algebrasA and B of the same type, we say that B is a subalgebra
ofA iff the universe of B is included in the universe ofA and every fundamental operation
of B is the restriction to the universe of B of the corresponding operation of A.
Definition 4. Given an algebraA = 〈A;F 〉, a congruence onA is an equivalence relation
E on A such that for every n-ary operation f in F and elements ai, bi in A,
if aiEbi, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then f(a1, . . . , an)Ef(b1, . . . , bn).
The diagonal relation and the all relation are the only trivial congruences.
In this section, 3 will stand for the algebra 〈{0, 1/2, 1};F 〉, where F is either {∧,¬} or
{¬}. and ∧ and ¬ stand for the usual meet and meet complement in a Heyting algebra
(we might as well say that a ∧ b = min {a, b}, for any a, b in the universe of 3, ¬0 = 1,
and ¬1/2 = ¬1 = 0). In all cases, D = {1}. It will be clear in the context which is
the relevant F . The algebra 3 appears in Figure 4 together with the only non-trivial
congruence given by the ellipses. Note, also, that 〈{0, 1};∧,¬〉, where ∧ and ¬ are the
usual meet and meet complement, is a subalgebra of 3.
0
1/2
1
Figure 4: The algebra 3 with its only non-trivial congruence
Let us now consider the fragment {∧,¬}.
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Proposition 7. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F{∧,¬}. Then, Γ ⊢{∧,¬} ϕ iff Γ ⊢3 ϕ.
Proof. If Γ ⊢{∧,¬} ϕ, then Γ ⊢i ϕ. Using soundness of intuitionistic logic, it follows
that Γ |=3 ϕ. On the other hand, suppose Γ 0{∧,¬} ϕ. There are three cases: (i)
ϕ = ϕ1∧ϕ2∧· · ·∧ϕn, where each ϕi is a either a negation or a letter, (ii) ϕ = ¬ψ, for some
formula ψ, or (iii) ϕ = p, for some letter p. In case (i), by (R∧), Γ 0{∧,¬} ϕ1∧ϕ2∧· · ·∧ϕn
iff there is at least an i such that Γ 0{∧,¬} ϕi such that ϕi is either a negation or a letter.
So, this case reduces to either case (ii) or case (iii). In case (ii), using Theorem 3, we
have that Γ 0c ¬ψ. Then, there is a valuation v in the two element Boolean algebra such
that vψ = 1 for all ψ ∈ Γ and v¬ϕ = 0. Then, as the Boolean algebra of two elements
with fundamental operations ∧ and ¬ is a subalgebra of 3, it follows, using the same
valuation v, that Γ 23 ϕ. Finally, case (iii) means that we have Γ 0{∧,¬} p. Then, Γ
is {∧,¬}-consistent. Then, using Corollary 3, it follows that Γ is classically consistent.
Then, there exists a assignment v such that in the two-element Boolean algebra we have
that v¯ψ = 1 for all ψ ∈ Γ. Now, let us define an assignment w : Π → 3 such that
wpi = vpi, for all pi ∈ Π. Then, as the given Boolean algebra is a subalgebra of 3,
w¯ψ = 1 for all ψ ∈ Γ. If w¯p = 0, then we are done. In case w¯p = 1, let us define w′ like w
except for w′p = 1/2. Now, as Γ 0{∧,¬} p, then, due to (R∈) and (R∧), p can only appear
as subfomula of a formula ψ in Γ if it appears in the scope of a negation, and the value of
ψ will not change, as 〈(1, 1), (1,1/2), (
1/2,
1/2), (
1/2, 1), (0, 0)〉 is a congruence relation.
Now we can easily deal with the negation fragment.
Proposition 8. Let Γ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ F{¬}. Then, Γ ⊢{¬} ϕ iff Γ |=3 ϕ.
Proof. The left to right direction is the same as in the previous proof. For the other
direction, just consider cases (ii) and (iii) in the previous proof.
It is clear, then, due to propositions 7 and 8, that the fragments {∧,¬} and {¬} have
finite semantics.
A final remark. We have seen that we do not have finite semantics for many fragments
of intuitionistic logic. However, the Finite Model Property (FMP) holds for intuitionistic
logic (so, also, for any of its fragments). The difference may be understood as the differ-
ence between the quantifications ∃∀ and ∀∃, that is, we do not have a finite semantics
for all cases. Now, given any particular case that does not hold, we may find a finite
interpretation (for example, a Heyting algebra) that proves that it is not the case. The
reader interested in a proof of the FMP for intuitionistic logic may see [2, Section 11.9 ].
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